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A. WALLACE TASHIMA*
Yesterday we heard from some of the surviving participants in the World
War II Japanese American internment experience, including litigants and attorneys who participated in the various test cases in the United States Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts.2 This morning, we heard from a panel of
scholars who gave us a historical overview of the constitutional landscape sixty
years ago, when Korematsu v. United States3 and the other cases were litigated.4
This afternoon, yet another panel of scholars will give contemporary meaning
and perspective to those cases and demonstrate their relevance to today’s troubled world.5

Copyright © 2005 by A. Wallace Tashima
This Article also available at http://law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A.B., 1958,
U.C.L.A.; LL.B., 1961, Harvard Law School.
1. Keynote Address, presented for “Judgments Judged and Wrongs Remembered: Examining the
Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases of World War II on their Sixtieth Anniversary,” a joint conference by the University of North Carolina School of Law, the UCLA Asian American Studies Center, and the Japanese American National Museum.
2. Panelists included Fred Korematsu, the defendant in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Frank Emi, Yosh Kuromiya, and Gene Akutsu, litigants in the cases stemming from draft resistance at the Heart Mountain and Minidoka Relocation Centers; Lorraine Bannai, a member of the
team of lawyers that secured the overturning of the wartime convictions of Fred Korematsu, Minoru
Yasui, and Gordon Hirabayashi in Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984), Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445
(W.D. Wash. 1986); Eugene Gressman, law clerk to Associate Justice Frank Murphy of the United
States Supreme Court at the time of the Court’s decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. at 214;
and Eleanor Jackson Piel, law clerk to Judge Louis Goodman of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California when he decided United States v. Kuwabara, 56 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.
Cal. 1944), involving the draft resisters of the Tule Lake Segregation Center.
Eugene Gressman’s contribution to this conference is published in this symposium issue. See
Eugene Gressman, Korematsu: A Study of Military Imperatives, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 20 (Spring
2005). Recollections of Frank Emi and Yosh Kuromiya on the subject of the Heart Mountain draft resistance movement have been published elsewhere. See Frank S. Emi, Fair Play Committee, in
RESISTANCE: CHALLENGING AMERICA’S WARTIME INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS 98
(William Hohri et al. eds., 2001); Frank S. Emi, Protest and Resistance: An American Tradition, in A
MATTER OF CONSCIENCE: ESSAYS ON THE WORLD WAR II HEART MOUNTAIN DRAFT RESISTANCE
MOVEMENT 51 (Mike Mackey ed., 2002); Yosh Kuromiya, Fighting for My Country, My Constitution,
in RESISTANCE, supra, at 59; Yosh Kuromiya, The Fourth Option, in A MATTER OF CONSCIENCE, supra, at 77.
3. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
4. Papers from this panel include John Q. Barrett, A Commander’s Power, a Civilian’s Reason:
Justice Jackson’s Korematsu Dissent, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (Spring 2005); Patrick Gudridge,
The Constitution Glimpsed from Tule Lake, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (Spring 2005); Eric L. Muller, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Draft Resistance at the Poston Relocation Center, 68 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 119 (Spring 2005); Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (Spring 2005).
5. Papers from this panel include Margaret Chon & Donna Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (Spring 2005); Roger Daniels, The Japanese American Cases, 1942–2004: A So-
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I am not a scholar and I am not here to give you a scholarly dissertation on
the meaning of the World War II internment cases. My role, rather, is to bring
to this conference the perspective of one who lived through the evacuation and
internment and then went on to a career as a federal judge. In my twenty-four
years as a federal judge, both in the trial court and on the appellate bench, it has
been my privilege to participate in what I believe to be the primary mission of
the federal courts—to uphold the rule of law and to hold the government to its
constitutional obligations. Because we are all creatures of our past, I have no
doubt that my life experiences, including the evacuation and internment, have
shaped the way I view my job as a federal judge and the skepticism that I sometimes bring to the representations and motives of the other branches of government.
So if I stray somewhat today from the path that judges usually take in their
public remarks, it is because I believe that the voice of those who were wronged
by their own government more than sixty years ago needs to be heard in the
current debate on how the war against terrorism should be conducted.
Sixty years ago, I was in my third year as an internee in the War Relocation
Authority (“WRA”) internment camp at Poston, Arizona, on the Colorado
River Indian Reservation. I was ten years old and in the fifth grade at the
Poston I Elementary School. My fifth grade teacher was Miss Sato. Incidentally, I learned many years later that Miss Sato, and my fourth grade teacher,
Miss Omori, were paid $19.00 per month for their professional labors, but that
my third grade teacher, Miss Saddlewhite, who was white, was paid $150.00 per
month.
In any event, Franklin Roosevelt had just won reelection for a fourth term.
By November of 1944, the tide of war had clearly turned. The invasion of
France had successfully been launched on the beaches of Normandy some five
months earlier.6 The great naval Battle of Leyte Gulf had ended decisively in
our favor only a week earlier7 and had turned the tide in the Pacific War as well.
Yet, more than 80,000 Japanese Americans, most of them American citizens,
were still held in WRA internment camps,8 prisoners of their own government
in their own country. It would be nearly another year before my family and I
were permitted to return to our home in California, in August of 1945.
How did it happen that thousands of Americans were uprooted and forcibly
removed from their homes, sent into a desert exile, and detained in internment
camps in their own country, without any charges being filed, without any trial
being held, without the right to confront their accusers, without any hearing or
cial History, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (Spring 2005); Jerry Kang, Watching the Watchers, 68 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 259 (Spring 2005); Natsu Taylor Saito, Interning the Non-Alien “Other”: The Illusory Protections of Citizenship, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (Spring 2005); Eric Yamamoto, White
(House) Lies, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287 (Spring 2005).
6. See ROBERT GORALSKI, WORLD WAR II ALMANAC: 1931–1945 321 (1981).
7. See id. at 353.
8. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, THE EVACUATED PEOPLE: A QUANTITATIVE
DESCRIPTION 18 (1946).
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judicial review, and held as prisoners by their own government for over three
years? It happened, at least in part, because the federal courts, which were
supposed to be the bulwark protecting the Constitution from an overzealous
Executive, failed in fulfilling their mandate under Article III of the Constitution.
In the sixty years since the Supreme Court decided the Korematsu case, upholding the President’s right to order the exclusion of Japanese Americans from
the West Coast under his war powers,9 it has been subjected to intensive and extensive criticism. I think it is fair to say that most of the scholarly commentary
has been extremely critical of Korematsu.10 Lawyers and judges generally have
been critical of it, as well.11 Congress even passed an act recognizing the evacuation and internment as a national policy mistake of the first order,12 and President Reagan issued a formal apology on behalf of the nation for it.13 But, as we
have learned from recent history (to quote the popular maxim), “it ain’t over
till the fat lady sings,”14 and the fat lady has yet to make her fabled appearance.
Since the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, we have
had an administration and an attorney general determined to expand the constitutional limits of the President’s war-making powers, not against a foreign enemy, but here at home against our own citizens and residents. And we must live
with the discomforting reality that, sixty years after it was decided, the Korematsu case has never been overruled by the Supreme Court and, thus, as lawyers like to say, it remains “good law” today.15 I might also add that the Chief
Justice of the United States has stated—although in his role as a historian and
not in his capacity as the Chief Justice—that, in his opinion, if the Supreme
Court were to be faced with the same case today as it was in Korematsu in 1944,
it would make the same decision because of the Court’s historic deference to
the military and its reluctance to interfere with military decisions.16

9. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215-24.
10. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1993); Neil Gotanda, The Story of Korematsu: The
Japanese-American Cases, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 249 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004); Patrick
O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003); Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72 (1996);
Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933 (2004).
11. See Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. VA. L.
REV. 571, 586 n.75 (2002) (reviewing stated positions of currently sitting Supreme Court Justices regarding Korematsu); Susan Kiyomi Serrano & Dale Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A “Constant
Caution” in a Time of Crisis, 10 ASIAN L.J. 37 (2003).
12. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988).
13. See Julie Johnson, President Signs Law to Redress Wartime Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1988,
at A16.
14. This quotation, often mistakenly attributed to Yogi Berra, likely belongs to sports writer Dan
Cook.
See World Wide Words, It Ain’t Over Till The Fat Lady Sings, at
http://www.worldwidewords.org/qa/qa-ita1.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (on file with Law and
Contemporary Problems).
15. See Charles Ogletree, The Limits of Hate Speech: Does Race Matter?, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 491,
493 (1996–97).
16. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 218-25 (1998).
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To add some hard-to-digest frosting to that unpalatable cake, there has been
a revival in some extreme circles of the notion that the Japanese American internment was justified by the wartime record, and as being for the greater good
and for the security of America—and, more importantly, that comparable extreme, racially motivated measures are similarly justified today in the so-called
war against terrorism.17 I refer here, of course, to Michelle Malkin’s recent
book, In Defense of Internment: The Case for “Racial Profiling” in World War II
and the War on Terror.18
It is not my purpose today to engage in a critique of Ms. Malkin’s thesis, although I want to make it clear that I agree neither with its premises nor with its
conclusion. That necessary task has been ably undertaken by others, including
two of this morning’s panelists, Eric Muller and Greg Robinson.19 I mention the
book only as symptomatic of the kind of thinking behind the Bush Administration’s conduct in the war against terrorism.
In years past, when I have had occasion to speak on the World War II internment and my experience as a part of it, I have often prefaced my remarks
with the historian’s well-known reminder of why we study history: We study
history because those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it.20 There is
now a new and virulent strain of racism that touts the benefits of racial profiling, of wholesale “internment” of race- and religion-based groups, and of other
racist policies, not only as a historical matter (arguing that the World War II internment of Japanese Americans was fully justified), but also as a current matter (advocating the adoption of similar race-based policies in the current war
against terrorism). That was too much, even for The Wall Street Journal, which
had this to say in its October 1, 2004, edition: “Varying the famous maxim, Ms.
Malkin actually remembers the past but wants to condemn us to repeat it.”21
And, unfortunately, in my view, in the three years since 9/11, we have been repeating some of the worst that our past has to offer:
1. Hundreds of persons have been arrested and detained against whom no
charges of terrorist activities have been brought and whose identities
have not been disclosed.22

17. See, e.g., John Leo, The Internment Taboo, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 27, 2004, at 74.
18. MICHELLE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE FOR “RACIAL PROFILING” IN
WORLD WAR II AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004).
19. See Eric L. Muller, Indefensible Internment, REASON, Dec. 2004, at 59; Eric L. Muller & Greg
Robinson,
Muller
and
Robinson
on
Malkin,
at
http://www.isthatlegal.org/Muller_and_Robinson_on_Malkin.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (on file
with Law & Contemporary Problems).
20. See 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON: OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS
284 (2d ed. 1924).
21. Bookmarks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2004, at W7.
22. Amy Goldstein, A Deliberate Strategy of Disruption: Massive, Secretive Detention Effort Aimed
Mainly at Preventing More Terror, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A1; Neil A. Lewis, A Nation Challenged: The Detainees. Detentions After Attacks Pass 1,000, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at B1.
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2. Thousands of foreign nationals who are, for the most part, here in this
country legally, have been arrested for minor immigration violations and
held in secret detention.23
3. Thousands more have been questioned by the FBI, after having been
singled out for questioning based solely on racial, ethnic, or religious criteria.24
4. Private internet, medical, library, and university records have become
susceptible to search by the federal government under its newly granted
authority under the USA PATRIOT Act25 without a showing of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and without any
accountability.26 In fact, those whose records have been subpoenaed
under the USA PATRIOT Act are forbidden from disclosing that fact
or talking about it.27
5. And, most egregiously, the President has claimed the right to detain indefinitely American citizens without charges being brought, without the
right to counsel, and without the right to judicial review.28
All this is in an end-justifies-the-means war on terrorism that threatens to
destroy the very values of a democratic society governed by the rule of law that
we should be fighting to preserve. And there is more:
1. In our treatment of al Qaeda detainees, we have been careful to state
that we are complying with the “principles” of the Geneva Convention,
but not with the Convention itself.29
2. And even our observance of those so-called “principles” has been niggardly: At the highest levels of our government, we have adopted a
definition of “torture” which permits the infliction of physical and mental pain on prisoners of war and suspected enemy combatants, so long as
it does not result in significant long-term psychological harm or in physi-

23. See Dan Eggen, Long Wait for Filing of Charges Common for Sept. 11 Detainees: Delays Reasonable, INS Officials Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2002, at A12; The Talk of the Town: The Choice, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 1, 2004, at 40.
24. See Joel Stein, Just a Few Questions: The Attorney General Wants 5,000 Arabs Here to Come in
for a Chat. Is This the Way to Fight Terrorism? TIME, Dec. 10, 2001, at 41.
25. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
26. See Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security with Privacy under the
USA Patriot Act, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 375 (2002).
27. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) (Supp. I 2001).
28. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2636 (2004); Brief for the Petitioner, Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027).
29. Ari Fleischer, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030507-18.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2005) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems) (“Consistent with American values and the principles of the Geneva Convention, the United States has treated and will continue to treat all Taliban
and al Qaeda detainees in Guantanamo Bay humanely and consistent with the principles of the Geneva
Convention. . . . In addition, President Bush today has decided that the Geneva Convention will apply
to the Taliban detainees, but not to the al Qaeda international terrorists.”)
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cal pain that is equivalent in intensity to the pain of organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or death.30
3. This lack of moral leadership has, undoubtedly, been one of the principal causes of the inhumane and degrading mistreatment of prisoners at
the Abu Ghraib and other American-run prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and elsewhere.31
4. We have turned over suspected terrorists to countries known to our
State Department to subject such detainees to torture,32 in violation of
our obligations under the Convention Against Torture.33
As we have in the past, we have again turned to the federal courts to check
the excesses of the Executive branch. Will the courts again fail to fulfill their
constitutional obligation, as they did in Korematsu? Although the final chapter
in the judiciary’s response to the government’s excesses in its conduct of the war
on terrorism has yet to be written, the Supreme Court did address some of the
issues in its last term, with mixed results.
The most important case was Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,34 which involved an
American citizen who was captured in Afghanistan during military operations
and who allegedly was an “enemy combatant.”35 The government asserted that
it had the right to detain Hamdi indefinitely, in a military prison on United
States soil, without any charges being filed, without the assistance of counsel,
and without the right of access to an impartial tribunal.36 The Supreme Court
first held that the President does have the authority to detain American citizens
who are, in fact, “enemy combatants,” because such detention has been authorized by an act of Congress—in this case the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, adopted by the Congress shortly after the 9/11 attack.37 The Supreme Court, however, went on to hold that if such a prisoner disputes, as did
Hamdi, that he is an enemy combatant, “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge
his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis
for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”38 In other words, a citizen-detainee
30. See Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Legal Counsel for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, at 1-2 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems).
31. On the prisoner mistreatment at Abu Ghraib, see SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF
COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB (2004).
32. See David E. Kaplan et al., Playing Offense: The Inside Story of How U.S. Terrorist Hunters
Are Going After al Qaeda, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 2, 2003, at 18, 27; Dana Priest & Barton
Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: “Stress and Duress” Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1.
33. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
34. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
35. Id. at 2635.
36. Id. at 2636.
37. Id. at 2639-43.
38. Id. at 2648.
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is entitled to minimal due process—notice and an opportunity for a hearing—
before he can be deprived of his liberty.
In reaching that conclusion, Justice O’Connor, speaking for a plurality of
the Court, made some noteworthy and pointed comments—the kind of comments that were spoken only in dissent and went unheeded in Korematsu. In
her opinion, Justice O’Connor said the following: “It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is
most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”39 She then
quoted from an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren thirty-seven years earlier: “It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would
sanction the subversion of one of those liberties . . . which make [sic] the defense of the Nation worthwhile.”40 And, in marshaling the arguments in support
of her conclusion, Justice O’Connor also quoted from Justice Murphy’s dissent
in Korematsu: “[L]ike other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional
rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial
process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests reconciled.”41 Finally, Justice O’Connor pointedly noted the following:
“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”42
In a companion case, Rasul v. Bush,43 a number of foreign nationals who
were being held as prisoners at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba,
sought to challenge the legality of their detention. The lower courts had thrown
out the lawsuit on the ground that because the petitioners were being held in a
prison over which the United States did not exercise sovereignty, the federal
courts had no jurisdiction to entertain their petitions for habeas corpus.44 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that the federal courts could hear
the case because the Guantanamo Bay Navy Base was an area over which the
United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.45 The case was returned to the district court to be heard on the merits. It is interesting to note
also what has happened in the case, or, more accurately, what has not happened, since the Supreme Court rendered its decision on June 28, 2004. In an
editorial on the ruling four months later, the Los Angeles Times noted that the
Bush Administration was stonewalling the Guantanamo decision, marshaling
one excuse after another for not complying with the Supreme Court’s directive.
The L.A. Times noted that “[a]s the administration continues to stonewall
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967)).
41. Id. at 2650 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting)).
42. Id.
43. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
44. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Al Odah v. United States,
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
45. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2696-98.

03_TASHIMA.DOC

14

11/22/2005 11:31 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 68:7

judges doing what the founding fathers intended—ensuring that the president
doesn’t overstep his authority—it is not a stretch to say that Americans are witnessing the makings of a constitutional crisis.”46
All in all, these cases, even in their tentativeness, still amount to a stinging
rebuke of the Administration’s stated policy of denying all legal rights to
American citizens being held in indefinite detention, based solely on the military’s designation of a citizen as an enemy combatant. They are also a firm rejection of the Administration’s companion policy that suspected Taliban detainees being held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base can likewise be denied
of all legal rights, including the right to an impartial hearing to determine
whether the detainee is, in fact, an enemy combatant. These and other court
cases, like the war on terror itself, are far from over—we will have to await future developments to learn how broadly or how narrowly the Constitution’s
protection will be available, even to American citizens in the context of the war
on terrorism.
In closing, let me paraphrase from a book review I wrote for the Michigan
Law Review47of Professor Muller’s book, Free to Die for Their Country,48 The
federal courtroom is the stage upon which both the majesty of the Constitution
and the failures of the rule of law are vividly displayed. Today, the cast in the
federal courtroom has changed from the cast some sixty years ago in San Francisco and Portland and Seattle in the curfew and internment cases, and from the
cast in Boise and Cheyenne and Denver and Phoenix in the draft resister cases;
but, like the stage itself, the scenarios remain familiar. In this post-9/11 world,
many of the themes played out in the World War II internment cases are being
played out again. As much as it was sixty years ago, it is again up to the federal
courts to protect the Constitution and the people’s rights under the Constitution. For if the courts fail, as Korematsu has taught us, there is nowhere else to
turn.

46. Guantanamo Stonewall, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at B24.
47. A. Wallace Tashima, Patriotism: Do We Know It When We See It?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2007,
2014-15 (2003).
48. ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN DRAFT RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR II (2001).

